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Abstract. This work addresses the challenge “how do we make better
security decisions?” and it develops techniques to support human de-
cision making and algorithms which enable well-founded cyber security
decisions to be made. In this paper we propose a game theoretic model
which optimally allocates cyber security resources such as administra-
tors’ time across different tasks. We first model the interactions between
an omnipresent attacker and a team of system administrators seen as the
defender, and we have derived the mixed Nash Equilibria (NE) in such
games. We have formulated general-sum games that represent our cyber
security environment, and we have proven that the defender’s Nash strat-
egy is also minimax. This result guarantees that independently from the
attacker’s strategy the defender’s solution is optimal. We also propose
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) as an efficient technique to com-
pute approximate equilibria in our games. By implementing and evalu-
ating a minimax solver with SVD, we have thoroughly investigated the
improvement that Nash defense introduces compared to other strategies
chosen by common sense decision algorithms. Our key finding is that a
particular NE, which we call weighted NE, provides the most effective
defense strategy. In order to validate this model we have used real-life
statistics from Hackmageddon, the Verizon 2013 Data Breach Investi-
gation report, and the Ponemon report of 2011. We finally compare
the game theoretic defense method with a method which implements
a stochastic optimization algorithm.
Keywords: Information security management, game theory, cyber
security.3
1 Introduction
Due to the growth of cyber attacks against government agencies and companies,
there is a need for more investment to protect networks and platforms which al-
low the exchange and the storage of important information. Large organizations
3 The original publication is available at www.link.springer.com.
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are more likely to employ a security manager whose main task is to lead Infor-
mation Security Management to mitigate cyber security risks. However many
companies do not have dedicated cyber security personnel, but the critical tasks
required to mitigate these risks must still be performed. In the latter case these
tasks need to be carried out by the system administrators who must allocate
part of their time for this. This is determined by other crucial non-security
tasks. Since time is a scarce resource for system administrators, the available
time to perform cyber security tasks should be ideally optimized. Hence there is
a need for a method that gets as an input a time allowance and identifies how
much time should be spent on tasks related to the defense of different parts of
the infrastructure. The importance of this challenge has also been highlighted
by Alpcan and Bas¸ar [1] (p. 9). This is a critical challenge given the fact that
an attacker usually aims at exploiting one vulnerability of the system whilst the
defending party must protect as many cyber security targets as possible. Sys-
tem administrators seek to maximize the mitigation of the greatest number of
attacks against the various assets while an attacker aims to maximize the prob-
ability of penetrating the different “security layers” and complete their attack
against a preferable target. This problem falls under the entire class of problems
ISO 27001 examines with regards to balancing expenditure to the information
security risk.
In this paper, we consider the global asset as the collection of all the data
assets of an organization. We additionally consider a target to be a piece of
hardware that has access to a subset of this asset. In our model the process of
allocating resources is to improve the performance of the defense of a system.
Our model defines the defense in terms of all the actions that can be performed to
improve the defense of a given target. We assume that each target can be attacked
by the exploitation of a vulnerability. The adversary follows a unique path to
penetrate into the organization’s system and compromise a target. Examples
of targets, vulnerabilities, as described by our model, and threats against these
targets, can be found in 2013 Data Breach Investigation report [2] published
by Verizon. By modeling a cyber security scenario in the form of targets that
attacks can be performed against and the set of all actions that can protect that
target, we are able to create a more compact and computationally feasible model
removing the interdependencies between actions. According to our model, the
attacker probabilistically chooses a target and plays with probability 1 all the
actions required to attack this target. Their decision is based on the different
profits they will obtain when they attack this target successfully and the baseline
defense applied to each of the attack paths towards the targets. However, we
assume that the attacker is not aware of the resource allocation strategy chosen
by the defender nor conducts surveillance to identify such strategy.
The research question that this paper attempts to address is “given that dif-
ferent targets have different weights how do we optimally allocate cyber security
resources to defend such targets?”. The defense of a target is indicated by two
security levels, baseline and best practice. The baseline shows the probability of
an attack against a target being mitigated, to guarantee that the basic security
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functionality of the systems is maintained, when no additional administrators
time has been allocated. The best practice defense denotes the percentage of at-
tacks that are mitigated assuming that the system is currently running the most
up-to-date security software as well as having had all patches applied and any
potentially exploitable data removed. These tasks could be carried out by allo-
cating additional system administrators’ time. An example of baseline defense
and resource allocation towards the provision of extra security is the following.
We can assume that an unmonitored spam filter stops a certain percentage of
junk e-mail, for example 60% which corresponds to the baseline defense. By hav-
ing an administrator monitoring and upgrading the spam filters, more attacks
can be prevented, and for instance 90% of the spam is mitigated. Thus under
any resource allocation strategy, in terms of man hours, where an administrator
is assigned to perform a spam filter based action, we have an improvement of
50% in stopping junk emails over the baseline defense.
In this paper we use game theory to model the cyber security environment
and challenge of resource allocation as described above. Any resource allocation
problem must consider the strategies available to the adversary and the cyber
security team of the organization thus making game theory an appropriate tool
to model such an environment and provide an effective set of solutions. According
to [1] (p. 40), “A game-theoretic framework for defensive decision-making has
a distinct advantage over optimization as it explicitly captures the effects of the
attacker behavior in the model, in addition to those of the defensive actions. Plain
optimization formulations, on the other hand, focus only on the optimization of
defensive resources without taking attackers into account.”
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related
work from the state-of-the-art on the intersection of game theory and security.
In Section 3, we propose our game theoretic model while in Section 4 we under-
take comparisons against alternative methods. Finally, Section 5 concludes this
paper by summarizing its main contributions and highlighting future work to be
undertaken to further improve the performance and the usability of our model.
2 Related work
A significant amount of work on the intersection of economics and information
security has been published by Grossklags. The authors in [3] discuss the factors
that influence the decision process of individuals regarding their information
security concerns. They contribute to the formulation of information policies
and technologies regarding personal information security and privacy. The work
published in [4] examines the weakest target game which refers to the case where
an attacker is always able to compromise the system target with the lowest level
of defense and not to cause any damage to the rest of the targets. The game
theoretic analysis the authors have undertaken shows that the game leads to a
conflict between pure economic interests and common social norms. While the
former are concerned with the minimization of cost for security investments, the
latter imply that higher security levels are preferable. A very thorough work has
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been published in [5] where the authors model security interactions by choosing
different games such as weakest-link or best-shot to represent practical security
scenarios. In these games, decision parameters are a protection level determining
the security level chosen for the player’s resources and a self-insurance level which
mitigates damages when a successful attack occurs.
Security problems have been increasingly studied by using Stackelberg games
to model the strategic interaction between a defender and an attacker. Some
physical security games such as [6] assume the existence of targets that might
be covered or uncovered during an attack. In [6], Kiekintveld et al. make the
assumption that it is always preferable for the defender to defend as many tar-
gets as possible to obfuscate vulnerabilities over a period of time. The resulting
players’ payoffs depend only on the attacked target and whether this is covered
by the defender or not. An important contribution is the work conducted by
Korzhyk et al. in [7], showing how a leader (defender) should derive their strat-
egy given that the security game could be either a Nash or a Stackelberg game.
They also examine the case of a follower (attacker) who can attack more than
one target. The authors show that Nash and Stackelberg strategies are the same
in the majority of cases only when the follower attacks just one target.
Another recent contribution within the field of physical security has been
published in [8], where the authors address the problem of finding an optimal
defensive coverage. Because of the uncertainty about the attacker’s payoffs they
define such coverage as the one maximizing the worst-case payoff over the targets
in the potential attack set. In a cyber security game we can consider that a
defender may not know the payoffs for an attacker and they may be able to infer
some bounds for those payoffs. Work published by Lye and Wing [9] uses a non-
zero sum stochastic game model where an adversary is attacking an enterprise
network and a network security administrator is defending the different network
assets (e.g. web server, file server, workstation). A thorough survey of research
contributions within the broad field of security and privacy in computer networks
modeled by game-theoretic approaches has been carried out in [10].
3 Game Theoretic Formulation
We define a cyber security game as a game-theoretic model that captures es-
sential characteristics of resource allocation decision making (i.e. system admin-
istrators’ time) to prevent data loss and defend system and network assets of
an organization. This is a two-player, non-cooperative static game between a
system security team, defender D, which defends an organization’s information
assets and data against external or insider adversaries who are modeled as an
omnipresent attacker A. Our model follows the definitions of the work done by
Korzhyk et al. in [7]. The attacker A might choose to attack any target from
the available set of targets T = t1, t2, . . . , tn whilst D aims to mitigate attacks
by defending targets using resources. In our game the targets are data assets
accessible by specific hardware components and system administrators are the
limited resources. We consider a schedule as a unique allocation of system ad-
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ministrators to perform tasks that will update the targets defense from baseline
to best practice. We define the set of available defense schedules as S. The utility
of D when ti is attacked and has no resources assigned to it equals the baseline
defense utility U blD (ti). On the other hand, if D has assigned some resource to de-
fend ti then their best practice defense utility equals U
bp
D (ti). Finally, the utility
in case where no attack has taken place equals zero.
Likewise for A, we define their utility values as U blA (ti) and U bpA (ti), respec-
tively. Moreover, we denote the difference between best practice and baseline
utilities of a target ti for both players as ∆UD(ti) and ∆UA(ti). We observe that
by applying a given resource to a target, the utility of D for this target increases
and the utility of A decreases; namely ∆UD(ti) > 0 and ∆UA(ti) < 0. Similarly
to the aforementioned example of a spam filter, let’s assume that the baseline
defense probability of a spam filter is 60% while the best practice defense prob-
ability equals 90%. If the damage caused to the organization due to a successful
attack against this spam filter is given by l = −100 then the baseline utility
value equals Ubl = −40 and the best practice equals Ubp = −10.
The normal form of this game is described as follows. A’s pure strategy space
is the set of targets, while their mixed strategy is denoted by A = 〈ai〉, where ai
represents the probability of attacking a target ti. A schedule (or pure strategy)
of D is a feasible unique assignment of resources to cover (i.e. provide best
practice defense) the different targets. Assuming that one resource is adequate
to provide best practice defense for a target, a pure strategy is represented by a
tuple s = 〈si〉 ∈ {0, 1}n, where si equals 1 when ti is defended by best practices;
or 0 when only baseline defense is in place. Due to limited resources we define
the feasible schedules by S ⊆ {0, 1}n. The number of schedules available to
m administrators in the case of n targets equals n!(n−m)!m! . For example for a
scenario with 4 targets, when the number of system administrators equals two
then the available schedules are:
S = {< 1,1,0,0 >,< 1,0,1,0 >,< 1,0,0,1 >,
< 0,1,1,0 >,< 0,1,0,1 >,< 0,0,1,1 >}
In this paper we assume homogeneous resources, namely each resource can apply
best practice defense equally for each of the targets, allowing all the possible
resource allocation schedules to be played. The mixed strategy D = 〈ds〉 of the
defender is a probability distribution over the different schedules, where ds is
the probability of playing a schedule s ∈ S. We define the coverage induced by
the strategy D to be the vector C = 〈ci〉, where the probability ci of applying
the best practice defense for a target i is given by ci =
∑
s∈S sids. Going back
to our previous example with 4 targets and 2 system administrators, assuming
a mixed strategy D = 〈0.3, 0.2, 0.15, 0.15, 0.1, 0.1〉 for the defender then the
coverage vector equals C = 〈0.65, 0.55, 0.45, 0.35〉. Following [7], we define the
utility functions of both players as follows.
Definition 1 (utilities of the cyber security game). When a strategy profile
〈D,A〉 is played, the utility values of both players are given by the following:
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UD(D,A) =
n∑
i=1
ED,C(ti) =
n∑
i=1
ai(ciU
bp
D (ti) + (1− ci)U blD (ti)) (1)
UA(D,A) =
n∑
i=1
EA,C(ti) =
n∑
i=1
ai(ciU
bp
A (ti) + (1− ci)U blA (ti)) (2)
If both players act rationally the game theoretic solution, upon their simul-
taneous moves is the Nash Equilibrium (NE).
Definition 2 (NE of the cyber security game). A pair of mixed strategies
〈D,A〉 forms an NE if the following are satisfied:
I. D plays a best-response that is UD(D,A) ≥ UD(D′,A),∀ D′
II. A plays a best-response that is UA(D,A) ≥ UA(D,A′),∀ A′
In a game it is possible that there are many NE. However in presence of
unknown attack distributions not all Nash defenses perform equally. Therefore
we are interested in the particular NE that most favors the targets with the
highest defender’s utility. We define the NE’s weight as:∑
1≤i≤n
(ciU
bp
D (ti) + (1− ci)U blD (ti)).
Definition 3. The weighted NE has the maximal weight among all NE.
In the case that there exists more than one NE with maximal weight any of these
equilibria can be chosen as the weighted NE. Notice the NE’s weight differs from
the defender’s utility in that the attacker’s strategy is ignored. In the remaining
of this paper, unless otherwise stated, by NE we refer to the weighted NE.
3.1 Characterization of Nash defense
In a real scenario attackers and defenders often have different preferences and
criteria for evaluating the financial impact of a successful attack, as such it is
unrealistic to expect that cyber security games are necessarily zero-sum. Thus, in
our cyber security game, players typically weigh the same outcomes in different
ways. In our model we have made the assumption that both players assess the
different targets in a proportionally equivalent manner.
In the following we have proven that the Nash defense is a minimax strategy
for the defender which implies that it minimaximizes the attacker’s utility in the
cyber security game. This follows the work reported in [7]. We represent the set
of all defender’s Nash strategies of a non-zero sum cyber security game G as SGNE
and the set of all defender’s minimax strategies as SGMM . We define a zero-sum
cyber security game Ĝ in which the baseline and best practice utilities of the
attacker for each target are equivalent to their utilities in G, therefore:
Û bpA (ti) = U
bp
A (ti),∀ti ∈ T, and Û blA (ti) = U blA (ti),∀ti ∈ T (3)
Since Ĝ is a zero-sum game, we know that Û bpD (ti) = −Û bpA (ti) and Û blD (ti) =
−Û blA (ti). We define a function µ which maps the attacking probabilities of each
target in Ĝ to the attacking probabilities in G as defined in [7]:
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µ(ai) = âi = λai
∆UD(ti)
∆UA(ti)
,∀ti ∈ T (4)
where µ(ai) is the probability of a target ti to be attacked in Ĝ, therefore µ(A) =
Â. Respectively the set of defender’s Nash strategies in G is represented by SGNE
and the set of defender’s minimax strategies by SGMM .
Proposition 1. 〈D?, A?〉 is NE profile in G iff 〈D?, µ(A?)〉 is NE profile in Ĝ.
Proof. To prove proposition 1, we have combined Lemmas 1 and 2 presented in
appendix. We have that A? and µ(A?) are the attacker’s best responses, in G
and Ĝ respectively, to the same defender’s best response D?. Therefore the tuple
of strategies 〈D?, A?〉 is NE profile in G iff 〈D?, µ(A?)〉 is NE profile in Ĝ. This
implies that D? is a Nash defense in G iff it is also a Nash defense in Ĝ.
uunionsq
Theorem 1. A defender’s Nash strategy in the non-zero sum cyber security
game is also a defender’s minimax strategy in the same game.
Proof. The minimax theorem states that for zero sum games NE and minimax
solution coincide. Thus D? is a Nash defense in Ĝ iff D? is a minimax defender’s
strategy in Ĝ namely D? ∈ SĜMM . This means D? minimaximizes the utility of
the attacker in the zero-sum game where the defender’s strategy is as in G:
D? = argminD max
Â
UA(D, Â).
We also have that UA(D, Â) equals:
n∑
i=1
âi(ciU
bp
A (ti) + (1− ci)U blA (ti)) =
n∑
i=1
λai
∆UD(ti)
∆UA(ti)
(ciU
bp
A (ti) + (1− ci)U blA (ti))
From the above UA(D, Â) ≤ UA(D, Â′) ⇐⇒ UA(D,A) ≤ UA(D,A′) because
the left hand side of the ⇐⇒ is the right hand side multiplied by the constant(s)
λ∆UD(ti)∆UA(ti) . Hence minimum and maximum of the ordering are preserved, therefore
a minimax in Ĝ is also a minimax in G. Using proposition 1 we conclude that a
defense strategy D? is NE equilibrium in G and Ĝ therefore it is a minimax in
Ĝ and, by the above argument, it is also a minimax in G. uunionsq
This result guarantees that independently from the attacker’s strategy the de-
fender’s solution is optimal.
3.2 Minimax Solver with Singular Value Decomposition
Given the high number of possible targets within an organization the game for-
mulation is subject to the “state explosion problem” [11]. Therefore there is a
need for a method which will compute Nash defenses for large number of tar-
gets. This must be computationally fast and provide reasonable precision in the
calculation of the equilibrium. A possible approach is to look for an abstraction
of the payoff matrices where only the most relevant features of such matrices are
kept and minor features are discarded. We achieve this by using Singular Value
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Decomposition (SVD) to reduce the rank of the individual payoff matrices. To
the best of our knowledge, there are no general results about game solutions
for rank reduced payoff matrices. The closest work, undertaken by Kannan and
Theobald [12], performs rank reduction of the matrix given by the sum of the
payoff matrices of the two players.
Based on the Ponemon report 2013 [13], we have illustrated the payoff matri-
ces in Table 1. We notice that these matrices have a particular underlying struc-
ture which is mostly captured in the very first singular values. In other words,
there are few dominant singular values, usually two or three. By ignoring the sin-
gular values after the second or third largest, we obtain reasonably close solutions
to the original game solutions and a dramatic speed up of the computation. As
an example for a game with 8 targets, 1 security administrator, and payoff matri-
ces illustrated in Table 3, the singular values are 〈792, 108, 91, 42, 22, 12, 10, 3〉.
This means the first component already provides a reasonable approximation
to the original matrix and the components after the third component can be
treated as “noise”. The speed-up in performance is mainly caused by the fact
that the rank reduction, in our games, results in a large number of strategies
becoming dominated. For example in a game with 120 strategies and rank 10,
around 3/4 become dominated when the rank is reduced to 6. By comparing
the equilibria found in a 10 targets, 2 system administrators game and its SVD
rank 2 abstraction (Table 2), we found that there is aperformance improvement
of more than 1000 times while the approximate solution only slightly deviates
from the precise solution.
4 Model Comparison
To evaluate our game theoretic model we want to compare the performance
of the Nash resource allocation method (Minimax solver with Singular Value
Decomposition) which is given by the NE of the cyber security game, against
alternative methods. The methods we have selected for comparison are based
on approximations to two common sense approaches that one might consider,
called Uniform and Weighted as well as a stochastic optimization algorithm
called Acceptable Coverage.
The Uniform defense distribution gives no preference to any target that a
defender wants to defend meaning that all targets are given equal probability
to be defended. This method is a naive approach that assumes no knowledge on
the part of the defender to decide how much each target is valued or how likely
a target is to be attacked.
The Weighted defense distribution creates a probability distribution based on
the value of each target that is being defended. According to this approach, the
time a defender allocates to protect a target is proportional to its importance.
A distribution of time across schedules is calculated such that each target is
covered and the sum of the probability for playing each of the particular sets of
defenses equals the intended coverage for each target. For example if a target t1
should be defended with probability 0.2, then all schedules that include a defense
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of t1 should sum to 0.2. This results in more time being scheduled to perform
tasks which improve the defense of the targets that are either more vulnerable or
more valuable to the organization. While this does not necessarily represent the
best possible cyber security decision, this method identifies at least an average
decision maker, that provides a reasonable defense by which to measure the
improvement that the Nash defense introduces.
Acceptable Coverage. We compare the minimax solution to a stochastic op-
timization algorithm with uncertainty in the attacker’s payoffs. This approach is
similar to the one published in [8] where the authors define a defensive coverage
as the one maximizing the worst-case payoff over the targets in the potential
attack set4. For a given target we have two intervals from which the attacker
gets their utility based on the applied defense; baseline or best practice. These
are represented as [Umin,blA , U
max,bl
A ] and [U
min,bp
A , U
max,bp
A ], respectively.
When uncertainty about the attacker’s payoff is introduced, the concept of at-
tack set gets more involved because we do not know what the maximum expected
payoff for the attacker is. One is then led to define a potential attack set for a cov-
erage as the set of all targets that could give the attacker the maximum expected
value, for any attacker’s payoffs that can be extracted from the intervals of the
payoffs. Given a coverage C the attacker can be guaranteed a payoff of at least
the maximum of the minimum values over all targets; R(C) = maxti E
min
A,C(ti)
where EminA,C(ti) = ai(ciU
min,bp
A (ti) + (1− ci)Umin,blA (ti)). R(C) defines the poten-
tial attack set associated to the coverage C as A(C) = {ti|EmaxA,C (ti) ≥ R(C)}.
Following these ideas we look for a defender’s strategy giving the best utilities
guaranteed. As such the defender will choose a strategy providing best coverage,
where a coverage is better than another coverage if the former guarantees both a
higher minimum expected utility for the defender and a lower maximum expected
utility for the attacker compared to the latter. More formally we define the
coverage ordering as follows:
C ≥ C ′ ⇐⇒ min
i
(ED,C(ti)) ≥ min
i
(ED,C′(ti)) ∧max
j
(EminA,C(tj)) ≤ max
j
(EminA,C′(tj))
Given a set of coverages maximal with respect to the above ordering a coverage
is acceptable if it is the maximal element, with respect to the defender’s utility,
of this set. If a coverage is acceptable then we have considered all attacker’s
payoffs that can be extracted from the payoffs intervals otherwise there would
be a coverage above it, contradicting maximality.
Comparisons. We have undertaken simulations to identify how effective a Nash
defense performs against distributions created by the Uniform, Weighted and
Acceptable Coverage methods. For the purposes of testing we consider an orga-
nization like an online store whose assets include users payment details, website
4 In security games without uncertainty, the attack set is defined as the set of all
targets that give the attacker the maximum expected payoff, given some coverage.
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target ID t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
cost ($) 10k 30k 50k 75k 150k
target ID t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
cost ($) 250k 350k 450k 750k 3m
Table 1. Financial cost of an orga-
nization based on the findings of the
Ponemon 2011 report [13].
Rank Time (s) Value
10 (no SVD) 204 -615.744
8 60 -614.854
6 1.8 -617.732
4 0.4 -616.124
2 0.1 -616.651
Table 2. Times and defender utilities
for a 10 targets 2 system administrators
games using SVD.
ID t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
8 t. 0.011 0.016 0.016 0.039 0.061
10 t. 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.016 0.016
ID t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
8 t. 0.127 0.332 0.398 - -
10 t. 0.038 0.060 0.125 0.327 0.392
Table 3. Probability of Attack per
Target based on Statistics from Hack-
mageddon [14].
ID t1 t2 t3 t4 t5
8 t. 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.080 0.133
10 t. 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.063
ID t6 t7 t8 t9 t10
8 t. 0.222 0.222 0.244 - -
10 t. 0.008 0.125 0.208 0.208 0.229
Table 4. Probability of Attack per
Target based on Statistics from Veri-
zon [2].
configurations and data related to operational procedures. The most valuable
target would be a database server with the most of clients’ details. This could
be compromised by an SQL injection attack. The second most valuable target
would be the store’s website that an attacker could deface by modifying data of
the web server the website is located at. The rest of the targets could consist
of the mail server and different workstations. The device of each user, seen as a
target, has a value related to the privileges that a user obtains. To undertake our
comparisons, the values of utilities for each target have been taken from a report
on data breaches [13], where the utility per target is given by mid-value for each
of the ranges of damage reported, and are presented in Table 1. We consider
two different sizes of online stores in terms of reputation, number of clients and
amount of data held. The larger store has 10 targets while the smaller one has
8. We assume that the organization is limited to the number of system admin-
istrators that they have available to them and cannot cover all the targets at
one time. We test the defense of a system with up to 3 administrators. These
choices seem reasonable for such organizations in our proof-of-concept compar-
isons. The utilities for the attacker in this scenario are set at 20% of the value
that the defender has for each given target. This is to represent that an attacker
will still receive a large payoff for successfully attacking a target. However while
the defender may have long term damage, the attacker’s profit will generally be
given by the immediate impact that their actions have. For the comparisons we
have used 2 specific attack distributions given by the Hackmageddon [14] and
Verizon data sets [2], where any of the attack distributions, shown in Tables 3
and 4, represents an unknown attacker that is attempting to breach a target.
While we have identified the range of damages that can be expected from a
successful attack, the values themselves do not necessarily reflect a single attack,
so we consider varying the utilities both players perceive for each target. By
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varying the utility of each target, we are capable of identifying if the Nash
method performs better than either of the other methods independently of the
cost of each target. We vary the utilities as presented in Table 1 by adjusting
the values perceived by the defender, where the experimental bounds allow for
a deviation of up to 10% from the stated utilities for each target. The baseline
defense has been fixed at a 50% breach rate for each target while the best practice
defense reduces that rate to 20%. These numbers have been decided artificially
for the model validation.
Performance evaluation. We define the performance of a solution as the
average amount of damage expected from any single attack, where the expected
damage is calculated as the result of an attack on a given target. In each single
attack one or more targets are defended following a schedule determined by the
specified defender’s strategy. If a target that is being attacked is not defended,
then the damage equals the baseline damage. If the target is defended, the loss
equals the damage with the best practice defense. To measure the performance of
a solution we have created a simulated environment, in Python, used to perform
attack sampling. For all comparisons performed, a sample size of 100,000 attacks
was used. Such a sample is referred to as a run in the results. In the following
we present the results, where 25 runs have been performed in each case and the
average of the percentage improvement and the standard deviation seen across
the runs have been plotted. We have set the rank values for SVD to 5 in both 8
and 10 target scenarios. These values allow us to minimize the runtime for each
of the comparisons while maximizing the accuracy of the results.
The percentage improvement seen in comparison to the uniform defense
shows a minimum improvement of approximately 15%. Comparably, the smallest
average improvement for Nash defense over the Weighted is around 7%. In addi-
tion to this, the maximum improvement seen in the Nash solution over the Uni-
form is approximately 50%, where the maximum improvement over a Weighted
defense does not exceed 25%. The improvements between different numbers of
administrators for defending a single system identify the impact that the addi-
tion of an administrator has in improving the defense. We see that with 8 targets
for both attack distributions the addition of more administrators increases the
improvement seen in the defense of the system by more, over the common sense
approaches. A large difference in improvement indicates that adding an addi-
tional administrator will have a greater impact on the defense of the system
than in the case of a lower level of improvement. This growth however saturates,
as when the number of administrators tends towards the number of targets the
improvement seen tends to zero. This happens because all targets can be covered
thus the expected damage is minimized across the whole system for all defender
strategies.
When comparing the Nash and Acceptable Coverage (AC), we see that unlike
the comparisons to the common sense approaches, the Nash defense does not al-
ways perform better. In contrast to the approximate performance as measured
against the common sense approaches, the average improvement does not exceed
12 A. Fielder et al.
Fig. 1. Improvement of Nash defense over the different methods for both Hackmaged-
don (H) and Verizon (V) attackers.
10% for either method. With the 8 target scenario, the results show that the AC
performs better for 1 administrator regardless of the data set used; specifically
the AC method appears to be approximately 2% to 3% better. However, when
there are 2 system administrators, the Nash defense performs between 2% and
6% better depending on the data set. With 3 system administrators the results
show that on average, for a Hackmageddon attacker, the AC method performs
better, but the Nash defense is preferable with a Verizon attacker. It should be
considered that the deviation of these results shows that in some circumstances
the improvement of one method over the other can be less than 1%. For 10
targets and 1 administrator we see that with both datasets there is no improve-
ment in the average performance of the Nash solution over AC, with a very small
standard deviation. This indicates that the allocation of system administrators’
time to targets is similar for both Nash and AC, where the randomized sampler
gives the deviation in the results. For more than 1 administrator it appears to
show a relatively large positive improvement for the Nash defense over the AC,
where the range improvement is approximately 2% and 5% for 2 and 3 adminis-
trators respectively using a Hackmageddon attacker. For a Verizon attacker the
improvements are close to 6% and 8% for 2 and 3 administrators. As has been
noted above, there is a small deviation in the approximate scheduler used for
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the AC method, which may account for some of the improvement seen by the
Nash defense and the reason for the large deviations in some of the results.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a cyber security model along with game theo-
retic tools to prove that common sense techniques are not as efficient at provid-
ing effective defense schedules as the ones computed by game theory. Our future
work includes interviews with system administrators to define levels of values
for the different model components. We are also interested in validating the ef-
fectiveness of the model when considering an organization where the number of
targets available to be attacked will range between 25 and 100. The efficiency
of performance for SVD is important given that there is a trade-off in time and
accuracy, where we have seen that even for small games it is computationally
inefficient to derive the equilibria. As such an interesting extension to this work
would be to measure the performance of SVD in terms of efficiency when large
games are played. We have described an environment where the defense of a
system is pro-active, but we don’t consider the scheduling of time in a reactive
manner in order to recover systems after a successful attack. In order to recover a
system, the time of available system administrators needs to be assigned to this
task, which limits the number of system administrators available to maintain the
defense of the system. Therefore a further extension of the game considers the
concept of optimally dividing the available resources between the recovery of the
system and the maintenance of pro-active security. One limitation of the current
model, that future work will address, is that in many cases the methods taken
by an attacker to break into a system may have steps that are relevant to more
than one target. In this case there are specific actions that can be performed by
a system administrator that effectively cover multiple targets.
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6 Appendix
Lemma 1. An attacker’s strategy A? is best response to a defender’s strategy
D in G iff Â? = µ(A?) is the attacker’s best response to D in Ĝ.
Proof. To prove this lemma we must prove that
UGA (D,A
?)− UGA (D,A′) ≥ 0⇔ U ĜA (D, Â?)− U ĜA (D, Â′) ≥ 0,∀A′
Solving (4) for ai we have that ai =
1
λ âi
∆UA(ti)
∆UD(ti)
and as we know that
∆UA(ti), ∆UD(ti), λ ≥ 0 the following holds:
UGA (D,A
?)− UGA (D,A′) ≥ 0
⇔
n∑
i=1
a?i (ciU
bp
A (ti) + (1− ci)U blA (ti))−
n∑
i=1
a′i(ciU
bp
A (ti) + (1− ci)U blA (ti)) ≥ 0
⇔
n∑
i=1
(a?i − a′i)(ciU bpA (ti) + (1− ci)U blA (ti)) ≥ 0
⇔
n∑
i=1
1
λ
∆UA(ti)
∆UD(ti)
(â?i − â′i)(ciU bpA (ti) + (1− ci)U blA (ti)) ≥ 0
⇔
n∑
i=1
(â?i − â′i)(ciU bpA (ti) + (1− ci)U blA (ti)) ≥ 0⇔ U ĜA (D, Â?)− U ĜA (D, Â′) ≥ 0
Game Theory Meets Information Security Management 15
uunionsq
Lemma 2. A defender’s strategy D is best response to an attacker’s strategy A
in G iff D is also best response to the attacker’s strategy Â = µ(A) in Ĝ.
Proof. To prove this lemma we must prove that UGD (D
?, A)−UGD (D′, A) ≥ 0⇔
U ĜD (D
?, Â)− U ĜD (D′, Â) ≥ 0,∀D′. We prove this inequality as follows
UGD (D
?, A)− UGD (D′, A) ≥ 0
⇔
n∑
i=1
ai(c
?
iU
bp
D (ti) + (1− c?i )U blD (ti))−
n∑
i=1
ai(c
′
iU
bp
D (ti) + (1− c′i)U blD (ti)) ≥ 0
⇔
n∑
i=1
ai(c
?
i∆UD(ti) + U
bl
D (ti))−
n∑
i=1
ai(c
′
i∆UD(ti) + U
bl
D (ti)) ≥ 0
⇔
n∑
i=1
ai(c
?
i − c′i)∆UD(ti) ≥ 0⇔
n∑
i=1
1
λ
∆UA(ti)
∆UD(ti)
âi(c
?
i − c′i)∆UD(ti) ≥ 0
⇔
n∑
i=1
âi(c
?
i − c′i)∆UA(ti) ≥ 0⇔
n∑
i=1
âi(c
?
i − c′i) ≥ 0
⇔∆ÛD(ti)≥0
n∑
i=1
âi(c
?
i − c′i)∆ÛD(ti) ≥ 0⇔ U ĜD (D?, Â)− U ĜD (D′, Â) ≥ 0
uunionsq
